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Today’s national-security state is increasingly highly concentrated, centralized, and consolidated across at least three dimensions: the public-private divide,
the federal-state divide, and the political–civil servant divide within government
agencies. Each of these dimensions of concentration, centralization, and consolidation has been individually examined. Yet notwithstanding careful study, there has
been little appreciation of the potentially reinforcing effects of consolidation occurring along any two, let alone all three, of the relevant dimensions. That is to say,
scholars and policymakers have generally zeroed in on only one dimension of consolidation at a time—and they have assessed the pros and cons of public-private,
federal-state, or intra-agency consolidation against what they treat as an otherwise
static backdrop.
This Essay insists that we need to think more capaciously and systemically—
to take stock of all of the moving parts and gauge how they work together. We need
to do so for purposes of smarter, more careful institutional design that accounts for
the multiple dimensions on which federal executive power has become concentrated
and consolidated. What’s more, we need to do so for reasons pertaining to constitutional separation of powers. The public-private, federal-state, and intra-agency
lines of separation are each constitutionally salient. Even if the weakening or collapsing of any one of those lines of separation does not by itself rise to the level of a
constitutional transgression, the weakening or collapsing of multiple lines of separation within a given substantive policy domain may well threaten our constitutional order. In short, this Essay proffers a multidimensional, aggregate-effects
theory of constitutional structure. The sum total of individually minor incursions
(on private, state, and bureaucratic autonomy) might constitute a major one as the
president and her agency heads accumulate power along multiple dimensions,
picking up bits and pieces from dragooned corporations, from co-opted states and
municipalities, and from a defanged federal workforce effectively serving at the
pleasure of the Administration.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s national-security state is increasingly highly concentrated, centralized, and consolidated. It is so across at least
three dimensions.
First, power across spheres is commingled and consolidated,
with the government contracting with, partnering with, deputizing, and otherwise directing private firms and individuals to advance military, intelligence, and homeland security objectives.1
Second, power across jurisdictions is consolidated, with one authority (usually the feds) dragooning, directing, and encouraging
other authorities (usually state and local agencies) to support
counterterrorism and emergency-management initiatives.2 And
third, power within any one government agency is consolidated,
with agency leaders asserting greater control over a good number of their department’s rank-and-file employees (who previously had been legally insulated from political pressure exerted by
those agency leaders).3
Each of these lines of concentration, centralization, and consolidation has been individually examined.4 And there is no
shortage of corresponding analysis of how centralization or consolidation along any one of these dimensions has (or is likely to)

1
See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of
Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It (Cambridge
2007) (addressing national-security privatization); Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 Tex L Rev 1435 (2010) (detailing homeland security public-private partnerships); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 Cal L Rev 901 (2008) (examining intelligence public-private
partnerships); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 BC L Rev 989 (2005) (describing military contracting); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib:
Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 Stan L & Pol
Rev 549 (2005) (same).
2
See, for example, Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: The
Domestic Use of the Military and the Power of the Several States, 5 Harv Natl Sec J 537,
633–35 (2014) (describing the coordination of federal and state resources for domestic
emergency-management operations); Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 Stan L Rev 289, 301–11 (2012) (detailing federal-state-local
intelligence partnerships); Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 Hastings L J 1441, 1448–55 (2011)
(same); Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)terrorism, 88 Tex L Rev
1715, 1717–24 (2010) (describing federal-local cooperation in counterterrorism efforts).
3
See generally Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115
Colum L Rev 515 (2015); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 Georgetown L J
1023 (2013).
4
See notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
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advance or complicate national-security operations.5 Yet notwithstanding careful study, there has been little appreciation of
the potentially reinforcing effects of consolidation occurring
along any two, let alone all three, of the dimensions mentioned
above. That is to say, scholars, policymakers, and journalists have
generally zeroed in on only one dimension of consolidation at a
time and assessed the pros and cons of public-private, federalstate, or intra-agency consolidation against what they treat as an
otherwise static backdrop.
This Essay insists that we need to think more capaciously
and systemically—to take stock of all of the moving parts and
gauge how they work together. We need to do so for purposes of
smarter, more careful institutional design that accounts for the
multiple dimensions on which federal executive power has become concentrated, centralized, and consolidated. What’s more,
we need to do so for reasons pertaining to constitutional separation of powers. The public-private, federal-state, and intraagency lines of separation are each constitutionally salient.
Even if the blurring or collapsing of any single line of separation
(public-private, federal-state, or presidential appointee–civil
servant) does not by itself rise to the level of a constitutional
transgression, the collapsing of multiple lines of separation
within a given substantive policy domain may well threaten our
constitutional order. In short, this Essay proffers a multidimensional, aggregate-effects theory of constitutional structure. The
sum total of individually minor incursions (on private, state,
and bureaucratic autonomy) may constitute a major incursion6
as the president and her agency heads accumulate power along
multiple dimensions, picking up bits and pieces from dragooned corporations, co-opted states and municipalities, and a
defanged federal workforce effectively serving at the pleasure
of the Administration.
I. THE SYSTEMIC AND REINFORCING EFFECTS OF
MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATIONAL-SECURITY CONSOLIDATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SMART INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The push to concentrate and consolidate governmental power—and national-security power in particular—has been quite

5

See Part I.A.
For a seminal work on aggregate effects in various legal domains, see generally
Ariel Porat and Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 Yale L J 2 (2012).
6
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strong in recent years, intensifying most notably in the aftermath of 9/11.7 It is well beyond the scope of this Essay to recount
the many discrete instances of such consolidation. Fortunately,
the trend is not an unfamiliar one—nor is it one whose existence
is subject to much dispute.
Accordingly, I begin my inquiry in medias res, as it were,
stipulating that much concentration has occurred and that it has
occurred along multiple dimensions, including (but not limited
to)8 the ones mentioned in the Introduction. Building on those
stipulations, Part I.A summarizes the principal arguments in
favor of and against public-private, federal-state, and intraagency consolidation as a matter of smart institutional design.
Part I.B suggests that the debate over consolidation is limited or
incomplete, in large part because participants in that debate
typically focus on singular, discrete consolidating efforts along
only one dimension. Given that the concentration of governmental power is occurring along multiple dimensions, often at the
same time, it is my contention that those interested in institutional design need to more fully appreciate the ways in which
the multiple lines of concentration can—and seemingly do—
interact with one another. Indeed, multidimensional consolidation is likely to amplify the advantages, or multiply the dangers,
that are associated with greater concentration of State responsibilities along any one dimension.

7
See notes 1–3, 8, and accompanying text. See also Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub L No 107-296, 116 Stat 2135; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638.
8
There are, in addition, important forms of centralization or consolidation occurring across national borders and between and among federal agencies. For an example of
transnational consolidation, see Austin Long, Partners or Proxies? U.S. and Host Nation
Cooperation in Counterterrorism Operations (Combating Terrorism Center, Nov 30,
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/Q9FD-BZL6. For examples of interagency consolidation, see Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 Colum L Rev 211, 221–34, 243–49 (2015);
Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
Harv L Rev 1131, 1155–73 (2012); Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, and
Barry R. Weingast, Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of
Legal Mandates, 59 Stan L Rev 673, 704–12 (2006). See also William C. Banks, And the
Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance after the Terror, 57 U Miami L Rev
1147, 1164–67 (2003) (noting the breakdown of the “wall” previously understood to separate law-enforcement from intelligence-surveillance operations).
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The Practical Virtues and Problems with Consolidation
along Any Single Dimension

Generally speaking, proponents of greater consolidation of
national-security responsibilities emphasize that State power
can be wielded more effectively and with far greater accountability when that power is indeed consolidated. Consolidation across
any of the lines of separation or division identified above helps
amalgamate otherwise disaggregated and often rivalrous power
centers, enabling government officials to more fully marshal, coordinate, and direct resources to address the task at hand. At
the same time, consolidation aims to reduce or eliminate various
points of drag, resistance, confusion, and competition (stemming
from what proponents of consolidation see as petty turf wars).
In what follows, I describe the purported virtues of consolidation along each of the following dimensions: public-private,
federal-state, and intra-agency. I then recount some of the main
arguments against efforts to concentrate State power.
1. Public-private.
Over the past couple of decades, government reliance on
public-private partnerships has skyrocketed. Such partnerships,
whether reached contractually or through less formal mechanisms,9 are ubiquitous across the range of government responsibilities.10 But they are especially prominent in the realm of national security, where military, intelligence, and homeland
security operations are regularly carried out by or with the help
of private actors.11
Those championing this fusion of public and private power
generally seek to expand, extend, and improve the efficacy of
government programs. Briefly, private actors can furnish the
State with additional manpower. Such force-multiplying effects
were certainly on display in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the

9
See, for example, Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Production of National Security, 98
Cornell L Rev 637, 683–85 (2013) (describing a range of public-private partnerships);
Michaels, 88 Tex L Rev at 1156–57 (cited in note 1); Michaels, 96 Cal L Rev at 904 (cited
in note 1).
10 See generally Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals: Privatization and the Public
Good (Beacon 2002) (discussing public-private partnerships in education, criminal justice, legal services, and welfare programs). See also David A. Super, Privatization, Policy
Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 Cal L Rev 393, 405–07 (2008) (describing the privatization of
several signature welfare programs).
11 See note 1 and accompanying text.
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number of private military contractors often matched and at
times exceeded the number of active duty American servicemen
and women.12 Private actors can also provide government officials with special access to otherwise unavailable or hard-topenetrate financial, travel, and social media databases, physical
locations, and telecommunications networks.13 Lastly, these private actors can sometimes carry out tasks that government officials are themselves prohibited by law from undertaking.14
Proponents of public-private partnerships contend that
without the benefit of such ongoing and dedicated arrangements, the government would be limited in its knowledge and
reach. That is, government officials would be forced to make do
with less15 or otherwise try to extend the State’s reach through
more adversarial means such as military conscription, subpoenas, and court orders. With a steady and ready set of private actors trained16 (and often paid17) to support and expand various
government efforts—and a sense of a shared enterprise that ongoing and tight-knit partnerships seemingly engender18—the
costs of gaining private sector assistance and the likelihood of
private resistance are reduced dramatically.

12 Moshe Schwartz, Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Background and Analysis *13 (Congressional Research Service, Aug 13, 2009), archived
at http://perma.cc/XH95-QMMF.
13 See Michaels, 88 Tex L Rev at 1435–41 (cited in note 1).
14 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U Chi L Rev 717, 734–
39 (2010).
15 See Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and
Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 Wash U L Q 1001, 1062–64 (2004) (suggesting that absent the availability of contractors, the US government would be forced to
scale back its military engagement, initiate a civilian draft, or rely more heavily on multinational cooperation).
16 See Michaels, 88 Tex L Rev at 1444–46 (cited in note 1) (describing the range of
government-sponsored training programs for private actors deemed potentially useful in
advancing or supporting counterterrorism initiatives).
17 Some of that compensation is indirect. See Michaels, 96 Cal L Rev at 913 (cited
in note 1) (considering the influence that large and lucrative government contracts unrelated to specific counterterrorism operations have on the willingness of telecom firms to
support those counterterrorism operations).
18 See Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records *20–50
(DOJ, Jan 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/EZ7R-9L4U (describing the camaraderie between telecom and government officials involved in surveillance partnerships, highlighting
the apparent enthusiasm telecom employees expressed as part of “TEAM USA,” and documenting those private employees’ efforts to help the government cut legal corners).
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2. Federal-state.
National-security operations are also becoming increasingly
vertically integrated. Generally, it is federal officials who take
the lead and direct their state and local counterparts—but the
converse happens as well.19 Consider, among other things, the
consolidation of federal, state, and local intelligence gathering
and analysis as prescribed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,20 the proliferation of joint terrorism task forces,21 and the development of a national network of
fusion centers.22
Supporters of such vertical consolidation recognize that federal, state, and local officials all have distinct strengths and
weaknesses, and thus that there is considerable value in bringing those officials together. Moreover, were federal, state, and
local officials acting more independently of one another, they’d
likely be bumping into each other, unwittingly duplicating each
other’s work, or even jeopardizing each other’s missions. The existence of fragile, broken, thin, or simply confused lines of control and communication thus threatens the efficiency and efficacy of any number of efforts. For these reasons, many have hailed
federal-state-local coordination and centralization, emphasizing
their particular importance in national-security contexts where
speed, comprehensiveness, and a clearly defined chain of command are often understood to be essential when it comes to
identifying and neutralizing threats.23

19 See Waxman, 64 Stan L Rev at 314–18 (cited in note 2) (describing state and locally led initiatives that involved partnering with the federal government).
20 Pub L No 108-458, 118 Stat 3638.
21 See Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(FBI), archived at http://perma.cc/PA49-6TWR (stating that 71 of the 104 joint terrorism
task forces were created after 9/11); Rascoff, 88 Tex L Rev at 1742 (cited in note 2) (emphasizing federal dominance over most joint task forces).
22 For a comprehensive overview of the fusion center program, see State and Major
Urban Area Fusion Centers (DHS, July 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A8ZH-KPFG.
23 See, for example, Waxman, 64 Stan L Rev at 292 (cited in note 2) (emphasizing
the importance of “harnessing state and local institutions for national security”); John
Ashcroft, Cooperation with State and Local Officials in the Fight against Terrorism *1
(Office of the Attorney General, Nov 13, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/5WZ8-ZR5A
(stressing that “law enforcement officials at all levels of government—federal, state, and
local—must work together, sharing information and resources needed” to deter and punish terrorists); National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States 215–41, 390, 401, 416 (Norton 2004) (underscoring the importance of vertical integration of American intelligence capabilities).
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3. Intra-agency.
A third and related pattern involves the consolidation of
national-security power within any one government agency.
Those clamoring for a more effective, fully mobilized, and fully
accountable government worry about the tensions and lines of
division that typically exist within most agencies. Specifically,
they worry about the rivalry (or simply the disconnect) between
top agency officials—appointed by the president and serving at
her pleasure—and the politically independent, job-tenured, career civil servants24 often alleged to be apathetic25 or hostile to
the interests and objectives of the presidentially appointed leadership.26 A more unitary expression of agency power (achieved by
truly subordinating career staff to the agency leaders) would,
they insist, streamline agencies and render them more politically responsive and accountable.27
Those seeking such intra-agency consolidation have been
quite successful. Over the past decade or so, hundreds of thousands of civil servants at the federal, state, and local levels have
been reclassified as at-will employees who now serve at the
pleasure of the agency leaders,28 with seemingly further reclassifications to come.29
24 See Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 538–47 (cited in note 3) (describing the rivalrous engagement between agency leaders and rank-and-file civil servants).
25 See, for example, E.S. Savas, Privatization: The Key to Better Government 4–6,
119–230 (Chatham House 1987); Kevin R. Kosar, Privatization and the Federal Government: An Introduction *4–5 (Congressional Research Service, Dec 28, 2006), archived at
http://perma.cc/2UNW-Q2KF; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L
Rev 2245, 2263 (2001) (describing bureaucratic “torpor”).
26 See, for example, Daniel Guttman and Barry Willner, The Shadow Government:
The Government’s Multi-billion-Dollar Giveaway of Its Decision-Making Powers to Private Management Consultants, “Experts,” and Think Tanks 28, 65, 151 (Pantheon 1976)
(characterizing political appointees’ frustration with a civil service viewed as hostile to
the president’s agenda); Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 572–73 (cited in note 3); Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573, 586 (1984) (recognizing that the civil service’s “cooperation must be won to achieve any desired outcome”).
27
This is presumably especially true in an era in which agency leaders are themselves highly politicized. See, for example, David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger:
Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 Geo Wash L Rev
1095, 1121–29 (2008); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “the Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo Wash L Rev 696, 707–08 (2007).
28 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2333 (2006) (documenting the recent
weakening of civil service protections for approximately 170,000 federal employees);
Michaels, 101 Georgetown L J at 1047–50 (cited in note 3) (identifying and describing
the “marketization of the bureaucracy” in which federal, state, county, and municipal
civil servants are being reclassified as at-will employees); Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at
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***
So far I have focused only on the purported advantages of
concentrating power. There are many who contest the benefits of
institutional consolidation in general and along each of these
three dimensions in particular. Some critics might even agree
with the goals of consolidation but remain dubious that the institutional redesigns or dedicated partnerships of the sort described above will produce the intended results. That is to say,
they’re skeptical that consolidation engenders the desired efficiencies or achieves the desired degree of institutional and organizational uniformity, homogeneity, and hierarchical accountability.
Others might be willing to concede that consolidation across
the public-private, federal-state, and intra-agency divides
achieves what it seeks to accomplish but nevertheless insist that
those aims are deleterious. This latter group of critics would be
one that affirmatively prizes a nonconsolidated space, where
power is purposefully and importantly divided to limit government overreaching; where redundancies constitute a different,
and better, method of ensuring nothing of consequence falls
through the cracks; and where the separation of authority and responsibility between, among, or even within institutions amplifies
a diverse set of viewpoints and promotes healthy competition
(such that there is incentive to find and root out problems and to
challenge questionable strategic, tactical, or legal decisions).30
584 (cited in note 3). See also Paul R. Verkuil, Deprofessionalizing State Governments:
The Rise of Public At-Will Employment, 75 Pub Admin Rev 188, 188 (2015) (discussing
the marketization of the bureaucracy at the state level).
29 See Office of Personnel Management and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Designation of National Security Positions in the Competitive Service, and Related Matters, 78 Fed Reg 31847, 31850–51 (2013) (allowing White House officials to reclassify current federal civil servants whose work responsibilities touch on national or
homeland security as at-will employees).
It bears mentioning that the Pentagon presents a distinctive case given it has both a
political–civil service line of separation as well as a military-civilian divide. Of late, attention has been given to the increasing politicization of the military leadership. See
Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic 43–64 (Belknap 2010).
Whether that politicization trend reflects a military-civilian consolidation similar to the
forms of consolidation discussed in this Essay or, instead, a troubling inversion of the
traditional and constitutionally resonant model of civilian control is beyond the scope of
this Essay.
30 See, for example, Cohen, Cuéllar, and Weingast, 59 Stan L Rev at 711 (cited in note
8); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal L Rev 1655, 1676–78 (2006) (questioning the
wisdom of interagency consolidation because such consolidation enables groupthink and limits creativity); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in
the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 Brooklyn L Rev 1277, 1290–91 (2004) (emphasizing the

208

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:199

B.

The Reinforcing Effects of Consolidation Occurring along
Two or More Dimensions

What I’ve just presented is a stylized, simplified account of
powerful and often far more nuanced claims. In doing so, I was
not covering much new ground, nor trying to; nor was I endorsing or challenging those claims on the merits. Instead, I am taking it as a given that consolidation achieves its desired effects
and am doing so to tee up what’s seemingly missing from debates and conversations about consolidation. Rarely have scholars and policymakers focused their attention on multiple lines of
institutional concentration happening in any one substantive
policy domain. Rarely too have they considered the aggregate effects of minimizing opportunities for rivalrous pushback and autonomous activity across multiple dimensions. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the military, intelligence, homeland
security, and emergency-management domains have each recently become more fully consolidated along all three of the dimensions this Essay highlights.
It isn’t altogether obvious why such integrative thinking
hasn’t more fully informed contemporary inquiries. A couple of
reasons do, however, come to mind. First, many practices and initiatives that result in consolidated State power are incremental,
subterranean, or piecemeal. As such, perhaps observers zero in
on the instant, marginal, or readily observable reconfiguration
of State power, focusing on that change to the exclusion of other,
less transparent consolidating efforts along other dimensions.
Second, different structural dimensions are more or less important to different groups of scholars. Perhaps scholars attend
to the particular dimensions that they study—for example, federalism or privatization—while downplaying the other axes of
consolidation.
For these reasons among, no doubt, others, there is an apparent need for more sweeping studies that would help show how the
multiple dimensions of consolidation seemingly interact with one
another as related parts in a system.31 To be sure, in some contexts the addition of a second or third dimension of consolidation
virtues of state autonomy vis-à-vis federal control); Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 552–
70 (cited in note 3) (explaining the problems that result from fusing public and private
power); Jon D. Michaels, Book Review, Running Government Like a Business . . . Then
and Now, 128 Harv L Rev 1152, 1168–70 (2015) (criticizing efforts to weaken intraagency rivalries).
31 See Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution 3–5 (Oxford 2011).
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might have only a marginal impact above and beyond what the
initial dimension achieved in terms of, among other things, increased operational efficiencies.
In other contexts, those second or third dimensions of consolidation might double or triple the efficiencies. For instance,
considerable federal-state consolidation in addition to extensive
public-private cooperation provides federal officials with two extra sets of resources to supplement their preexisting tools and
authorities.
And in yet still other contexts, the effect of multiple layers
of consolidation might be exponential. Consider the possibility
that there already exist surveillance partnerships between the
private sector and state governments. If federal surveillance operations are restructured to more fully integrate state and private resources, federal officials will be getting more than just
the benefits of two new and distinct sets of resources. These federal officials will also be acquiring the productive, synergistic
capacity of two distinct sets of resources that already know how
to work well together.32
Lastly, there might be some effects that are entirely novel—
that is, the combined effects of multidimensional consolidation
produce results that no one line of consolidation could generate
by itself.33 For example, a new and untested Department of
Homeland Security fortified through public-private, federalstate, and intra-agency consolidation might be a more formidable counterweight to the venerable and long-potent Department
of Justice in ways that—for better or worse—actually limit the
aggregate exercise of federal executive power.34 In such a case,
multidimensional consolidation in one domain (that of homeland
security) might actually result in a greater disaggregation of
power across domains (that is, between federal agencies).

32

See Citron and Pasquale, 62 Hastings L J at 1449–55 (cited in note 2).
Vermeule, The System of the Constitution at 4–5 (cited in note 31).
34 There is a rich literature on multiagency administrative collaboration and competition. See generally, for example, Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 Admin
L Rev 181 (2011); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 S Ct Rev 201; O’Connell, 94 Cal L Rev 1655 (cited in note 30).
For discussions of interagency rivalries in national-security contexts, see generally Jon
D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 Va L Rev 801 (2011).
33
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***
Given the number of federal agencies, state and local officials, and private parties involved in the development and administration of our national-security responsibilities, it is beyond the scope of this project to actually evaluate the reinforcing
(or counterbalancing) effects of multidimensional consolidation
on the ground. Thus, this Part of the Essay has necessarily operated at a level of abstraction, highlighting the risks of succumbing to the fallacy of systems vis-à-vis national-security consolidation, suggesting a framework for thinking holistically
about organizational and structural reform initiatives, and inviting more finely calibrated assessments of existing and proposed
forms of consolidated State power.
II. THE SYSTEMIC AND REINFORCING EFFECTS OF
MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATIONAL-SECURITY CONSOLIDATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The streamlining and consolidating taking place have resonance beyond pure questions of institutional design and practice. After all, these aren’t just any old lines being collapsed or
blurred. Rather, consolidation is occurring along some of the
most constitutionally salient fault lines. The separating and
checking of federal power is a cornerstone of our constitutional
scheme, as famously evidenced by its tripartite horizontal division among a legislative, executive, and judicial branch and by
its vertical structure that safeguards state prerogatives. Notwithstanding the central emphasis on tripartitism and federalism, the constitutional commitment to separation runs deeper
still.35 Consider, for example, the Constitution’s implicit delineation and protection of a distinct and autonomous private
sphere.36 Consider too the importance of intra-agency or administrative separation of powers (which, as I’ve argued elsewhere,

35 See Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An
Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 NYU L Rev *1, 7–15 (forthcoming
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/TT75-LS8G; Young, 69 Brooklyn L Rev at 1289 (cited
in note 30) (characterizing buy-in from multiple, diverse actors as a “pervasive institutional strategy in the Constitution” that includes, but extends beyond, the constitutional
separation of powers).
36 Many of the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights limit the reach of the State
and thus preserve private autonomy. See, for example, US Const Amends I–IV, IX–X.
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merits constitutional solicitude once federal power is regularly
routed through administrative agencies).37
This Part examines the potentially reinforcing effects of multidimensional institutional and organizational consolidation
through a constitutional lens. My claim here is the following: even
assuming that it is far from clear that any singular, unidimensional consolidating initiative or practice discussed in this Essay is
by itself constitutionally verboten (that is, no hard public-private,
federal-state, or intra-agency boundary has been transgressed),
the total effect of consolidation across multiple dimensions might
represent, in the aggregate, too much of an aggrandizement of
federal executive power.38 As will be discussed in Part II.B, an
aggregate-effects approach to constitutional analysis can help us
determine whether multidimensional consolidation has, in effect, gone too far.
A.

The Constitutional Resonance of Separating and Checking
Federal Power

In this Section, I highlight the constitutional significance of
the various lines of division central to this inquiry: the publicprivate, federal-state, and intra-agency divides. Again, because
this is a symposium essay, I paint in broad and quick strokes.
1. Public-private.
First, the public-private divide is arguably the most historically significant and universally recognized of all the divisions—
marking the State as different from the private sphere even in
unitary liberal governing systems that, unlike ours, do not feature horizontal separation of powers or a federalist structure.39
This public-private line of separation protects private autonomy;
limits the power and reach of the State; promotes a healthy division of labor and responsibility; and ensures that when coercive
force is exercised, it is exercised by democratically accountable
and legitimate officials.40
37

See Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 529–31 (cited in note 3).
See Porat and Posner, 122 Yale L J at 55–57 (cited in note 6) (describing the legal salience of aggregating strategies).
39 See, for example, Paul Starr, Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism 53–
58 (Basic Books 2007).
40 See Michaels, Book Review, 128 Harv L Rev at 1163–70 (cited in note 30) (emphasizing the State’s “specialness” in terms of its structural commitments to democratic
deliberation and reason giving); Department of Transportation v Association of American
38
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The public-private divide in the United States is, of course,
hardly impenetrable.41 But that divide cannot42 and ought not be
altogether trampled over. Whereas an independent private sector can serve as a vigorous check on State power, a deputized or
co-opted private sector is anything but such a bulwark. Instead,
such commingled government and private power very much enables the State (specifically, quite often, the federal executive) to
reach more broadly and deeply—and correspondingly limits private capacity to resist arbitrary or abusive exercises of State
power.43
2. Federal-state.
Second, the maintenance of a federal-state divide has long
been recognized as a constitutional imperative.44 It remains so
even after the fundamental reallocation of state and federal
power during Reconstruction and once again during the New
Deal.45 The reservation of constitutional powers to the states—as
reflected in, among other things, the Court’s recognition of traditional state police powers46 and its anticommandeering doctrine47—attests to an abiding concern for state autonomy. Thus
the vertical consolidation of federal, state, and local resources
threatens to chip away at not only state prerogatives and
democratic preferences but also individual liberty (given the
Railroads, 135 S Ct 1225, 1234–37 (2015) (Alito concurring) (stressing the importance of
public exercises of State power).
41 See William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in
Jody Freeman and Martha Minow, eds, Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democracy 23, 27–32 (Harvard 2009) (emphasizing the long history of “publicprivate cooperation” in the United States).
42 See Association of American Railroads, 135 S Ct at 1237 (Alito concurring) (asserting that delegations to private parties are unconstitutional).
43 See generally Michaels, 77 U Chi L Rev 717 (cited in note 14); Michaels, 115
Colum L Rev 515 (cited in note 3).
44 See, for example, Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 351 (Wesleyan
1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (emphasizing the “double security aris[ing]” from vertical federalism and horizontal separation of powers). See also generally Federalist 28 (Hamilton), in
The Federalist 176 (cited in note 44) (explaining that national defense powers and responsibilities are divided between the federal government and the states).
45 See generally Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations (Belknap 1991)
(describing the constitutional reallocation of powers during Reconstruction and the New
Deal).
46 See Bond v United States, 134 S Ct 2077, 2086 (2014) (“In our federal system . . .
[t]he States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good—what we have
often called a ‘police power.’ The Federal Government, by contrast, has no such authority
and ‘can exercise only the powers granted to it.’”) (citations omitted).
47 See, for example, Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 914–15, 933 (1997).
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potency of an effectively unified team of federal, state, and local
officials).48
3. Intra-agency.
Third, and admittedly least salient, are the lines of division
within agencies. To be sure, intra-agency divisions aren’t provided for in the text of the Constitution. Nor are they historically
resonant.49 What’s more, some would no doubt insist that such
divisions are, if anything, constitutionally suspect.50 Nevertheless, the rise and legitimization of modern administrative agencies (themselves not textually rooted51) have made these intraagency divisions constitutionally significant.
Elsewhere I contend that administrative agencies, which
combine previously separated legislative, executive, and judicial
power all under one roof, initially posed a fundamental threat to
the tripartite constitutional regime.52 This threat was neutralized, I argue, in large part by the eventual engendering of an
administrative separation of powers—with the presidentially
appointed agency heads, the politically insulated career civil
servants, and the diverse members of civil society (legally authorized to participate meaningfully in administrative matters)
48 See, for example, New York v United States, 505 US 144, 181 (1992)
(“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power.”); Young, 69 Brooklyn L Rev at 1290 (cited in note 30) (emphasizing the vertical
separation among government units as protecting liberty because little “can get done
without the cooperation of multiple actors at multiple levels”); Ann Althouse, The Vigor
of Anti-commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 Brooklyn L Rev 1231, 1235 (2004)
(contending that the constitutional safeguard against state commandeering preserves
liberty particularly in times when national-security powers are apt to be consolidated
and concentrated); Waxman, 64 Stan L Rev at 297 (cited in note 2) (“Federalism in the
sphere of national defense offered another safeguard against security-driven tyranny.”).
49 See Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap, The Federal Civil Service System
and the Problem of Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change 48,
51–52 (Chicago 1994) (recognizing that job tenure was not a central component of the
first wave of civil service initiatives); David E. Lewis and Jennifer L. Selin, Sourcebook of
United States Executive Agencies *69 (Administrative Conference of the United States,
Dec 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2HX2-ZN2N (documenting that by the midtwentieth century, job-tenured civil servants constituted over 90 percent of the federal
civilian workforce).
50 Although unitary executive theorists focus primarily on presidential control over
agency leaders, they nevertheless also recognize the incompatibility of, among other things,
civil service tenure with truly unitary control. See, for example, Steven G. Calabresi and
Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush
220–21, 230, 242–43 (Yale 2008).
51 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv L Rev
1231, 1233–49 (1994).
52 Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 520–21 (cited in note 3).
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serving in many respects as apt stand-ins for the three great
and rivalrous constitutional branches. It was this separation
within agencies—and this sharing and dividing of power among
three diverse administrative rivals—that carried forward and
renewed the constitutional commitment to separating and
checking State power as that power drifted into the administrative arena.53
One critical intra-agency line of division exists between the
politically appointed agency heads and the politically insulated
civil servants who have the legal authority and often institutional and professional incentive to resist overreaching by the
political leaders.54 To the extent that line of separation is blurred
or circumvented (by the reclassification of tenured civil servants
as at-will employees), efficiencies can likely be achieved. But
those efficiencies are achieved at a cost: intra-agency consolidation means that there are far fewer obstacles standing in the
way of hyperpoliticized, immoderate, arbitrary, or unchecked
exercises of executive power—of the sort that once again place
administrative power outside of the tripartite constitutional regime that spawned and seemingly valorized it.55
B.

The Aggregate Constitutional Burdens of Consolidation
Occurring along Two or More Dimensions

Each of these lines of separation contributes to a State that,
consistent with our constitutional project, is limited, rivalrous,
and heterogeneous. The State cannot act too broadly or reach too
deeply, at least not without significant, voluntary buy-in from a
diverse set of actors representing distinct institutions, jurisdictions, and constituencies.
It isn’t immediately apparent that any of this Essay’s discrete examples of national-security consolidation rises to the

53

See id at 551–52.
See Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between Internal and
External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L J 423, 445 (2009) (“[Civil servants] are committed to enforcing the governing statutory regime that sets out the parameters of their
authority and regulatory responsibilities.”); David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential
Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance 30 (Princeton 2008)
(“[Civil servants] often feel bound by legal, moral, or professional norms to certain courses of action and these courses of action may be at variance with the president’s agenda.”);
Harold H. Bruff, Balance of Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative
State 380–85, 408 (Carolina 2006) (considering civil servants’ respect for legal constraints as bolstering “the rule of law”).
55 See Michaels, 115 Colum L Rev at 565–74 (cited in note 3).
54
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level of a constitutional violation. But that should not be the end
of the constitutional inquiry. We still need to think systematically about the multidimensional nature of consolidation—and the
seemingly reinforcing effects of consolidation across two or more
dividing lines.
Specifically, each of the (for argument’s sake) relatively
modest federal executive incursions into the private, state, or
bureaucratic arenas might not amount to much of a burden on
those co-opted, subsumed, or subordinated institutions or jurisdictions—nor on those individuals and groups whom separation
is supposed to protect.56 Furthermore, it might well be the case
that no singular act of consolidation along one dimension represents too dangerous of an accretion of federal executive power.
But widening the lens and taking in the totality of consolidating practices along multiple dimensions reveal how those individually modest incursions seem to reinforce one another.
Simply stated, the combined effects of several minor incursions
might constitute a major one. It is death by a thousand cuts as
the president and her deputies accumulate power from the private sector, from states and localities, and from the previously
tenured and independent federal bureaucracy. Thus what might
once have been thought of as discrete instances of tinkering with
constitutional structure only at the margins now looks like a
manifold, even systematic (albeit perhaps unwitting and even
haphazard) attack on the very principles and physical embodiments of separated, checked, and limited constitutional power.
To help us puzzle through the aggregate constitutional effects of multiple minor incursions on structural safeguards, we
can draw on analogous doctrinal inquiries. In cases involving
constitutional rights and structure, courts have at times considered aggregate effects, finding the sum total of various measures
to be unconstitutional notwithstanding the fact that any one of
those measures would, in isolation, register as constitutionally
unproblematic. That is to say, in any number of circumstances,
courts deem one practice, by itself, to raise no constitutional
concerns unless and until that measure is paired with another

56 Structure is often valued for the way it protects liberty interests. See, for example, New York, 505 US at 181 (recognizing that federalism protects individual liberty);
Bond v United States, 131 S Ct 2355, 2364 (2011) (“Federalism also protects the liberty
of all persons within a State.”).
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(which by itself would likewise raise no concerns).57 Piecing together these disparate doctrinal inquiries and connecting them
to this Essay’s instant challenge give us the tools and vocabulary to confront the reconfigured architecture of our multidimensionally consolidated national-security state.
1. Rights cases.
Perhaps most notably, some courts in Fourth Amendment
cases have started to resist the practice of looking at particular
acts of government surveillance in isolation to “assess[ ] whether
[a] discrete step at [a] discrete time constitutes a search.”58 Instead those courts are considering the totality of surveillance activity—that is, whether the sum total of government monitoring
amounts to a “collective ‘mosaic’ of surveillance” that “can count
as a collective Fourth Amendment search even though the individual steps taken in isolation do not.”59
What I’m calling an aggregate-effects analysis surfaces in
election-law contexts as well. There courts have invalidated combinations of restrictions or requirements, while recognizing that
any one of those restrictions or requirements would, by itself, be
considered constitutionally unproblematic.60 For example, the
57 See Porat and Posner, 122 Yale L J at 50–53 (cited in note 6) (describing other
public law contexts where such aggregation might be useful).
58 Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich L Rev 311,
314 (2012).
59 Id at 313. See, for example, United States v Maynard, 615 F3d 544, 560 (DC Cir
2010) (recognizing that extensive and persistent surveillance can be unreasonable even if
any particular instance of such surveillance raises no Fourth Amendment concerns). A
plurality of the Supreme Court seemed to endorse this mosaic theory in United States v
Jones, 132 S Ct 945 (2012). See Kerr, 111 Mich L Rev at 313 (cited in note 58) (“The concurring opinions in Jones raise the intriguing possibility that a five-justice majority of
the Supreme Court is ready to endorse a new mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment protection.”); Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Surveillance Duration Doesn’t
Affect Privacy Expectations: An Empirical Test of the Mosaic Theory, 2016 S Ct Rev *8
(forthcoming), archived at http://perma.cc/4RQD-3QE2 (noting that in Jones, Justice
Samuel Alito’s “focus on surveillance duration makes the combination of two discrete
acts that are independently not searches—say, surveillance for one week and surveillance for the next week—a Fourth Amendment search”).
Such a mosaic theory has been used, too, by the government in nonconstitutional
cases. Notable among them are the government’s efforts to resist Freedom of Information
Act requests in which documents, “some or even all of which are harmless in their own
right,” can be combined in ways that “convert[ ] the harmless information into something
useful” to those intent on learning national-security secrets. David E. Pozen, Note, The
Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale L J 628,
633 (2005).
60 See, for example, Lee v Keith, 463 F3d 763, 765 (7th Cir 2006) (“In combination,
. . . the early filing deadline, the 10% signature requirement, and the additional statutory
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Eighth Circuit has held that laws requiring political parties to
“both conduct and pay for primary elections as a condition of access to the general election ballot” were “unconstitutional in
combination,” notwithstanding the fact that either requirement,
on its own, would have been permissible.61
Both the emerging Fourth Amendment case law and the
election-law doctrines reveal a willingness on the part of the
courts to think holistically and systematically about regulatory
regimes, identifying troubling patterns that emerge only by examining the interplay of two or more dynamic practices, encroachments, or impositions.
2. Structure cases.
This notion of an aggregate-effects constitutional violation
seems to apply in matters of structure, too—and that’s especially
important given this Essay’s focus. Consider Free Enterprise
Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.62 There
the Court addressed whether the members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)—an office within the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—could be independent of the SEC commissioners, given that the SEC commissioners are themselves independent of the president of the United
States. Free Enterprise Fund reasoned that one layer of insulation from the president would be constitutionally acceptable.
But “[t]he added layer . . . makes a difference.”63 That is, the sum
total of two layers of insulation rendered the SEC/PCAOB structural design unconstitutional (as it went too far in cabining presidential power).64 Tellingly, when this case was before the DC Circuit, Judge Brett Kavanaugh likewise focused on the aggregate
effects of the two distinct layers of insulation. He remarked that
restriction that disqualifies anyone who signs an independent candidate’s nominating
petition from voting in the primary [ ] operate to unconstitutionally burden the freedom
of political association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
61 Republican Party of Arkansas v Faulkner County, Arkansas, 49 F3d 1289, 1291
(8th Cir 1995). See also Douglas NeJaime and Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L J 2516, 2588 & n 290
(2015) (emphasizing courts’ heightened concerns with a combination of measures that
collectively undermine individuals’ “constitutionally protected reproductive rights”).
62 561 US 477 (2010).
63 Id at 495.
64 See id (addressing the aggregate effects of multiple layers of political insulation).
See also Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan L Rev 1, 18 (2013) (offering
a broader reading of the Free Enterprise Fund opinion consistent with the possibility that
the Court might still strike down a single layer of insulation if that layer had “bite”).

218

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:199

the scheme being challenged was not “Humphrey’s Executor redux”65—meaning that it was not just another case in which some
plaintiff was challenging the existence of a single layer of insulation between agency officials and the president (as was the
case in Humphrey’s Executor v United States66). Rather, Judge
Kavanaugh viewed the SEC/PCAOB scheme as “Humphrey’s Executor squared”67 because the scheme being challenged involved
two reinforcing layers of insulation from the president.68
The Court has also looked to aggregate or collective effects
when assessing encroachments on judicial powers. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor,69 the Court held that
relatively minor incursions on Article III powers along limited
lines would be constitutionally permissible.70 In so holding, the
Court contrasted the decidedly modest adjudicatory responsibilities given to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission with
the sweepingly broad adjudicatory responsibilities given to non–
Article III bankruptcy judges pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197871—which the Court invalidated in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co v Marathon Pipe Line Co.72 In distinguishing essentially minor from major constitutional incursions
on Article III judges’ authority, Schor emphasized that the
bankruptcy judges were given “all ordinary powers of district
courts” and were authorized to “preside over jury trials or issue
writs of habeas corpus.”73 In all, Schor indicated that the Court
would look at the sum total of encroachments on Article III
judges’ powers and decide in at least some instances that the
65 Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F3d
667, 686 (DC Cir 2008).
66 295 US 602 (1935).
67 Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F3d at 686.
68 Id at 699 (describing the SEC/PCAOB scheme as one in which there is one independent agency “that is appointed by and removable only for cause by another independent agency”). Note a version of this aggregate-effects test appears to have been used even
where the Court has considered the constitutionality of only one layer of insulation from
the president. In Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654 (1988), the Court listed the ways in
which the independent counsel was effectively insulated from presidential control and
found that the sum of those discrete forms of insulation did not “impede the President’s
ability to perform his constitutional duty.” Id at 691.
69 478 US 833 (1986).
70 Id at 851–53 (explaining that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s “adjudicatory powers depart from the traditional agency model in just one respect” and that
those powers reach into only one particularized area of the law and thus “do[ ] not impermissibly intrude on the province of the judiciary”).
71 Pub L No 95-598, 92 Stat 2549.
72 458 US 50 (1982). See also id at 87; Schor, 478 US at 852–54.
73 Schor, 478 US at 853.
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aggregate effects of those discrete incursions amount to a constitutional violation.74
***
Of course, in Free Enterprise Fund, the Court (and Judge
Kavanaugh below) feared too great a dissipation of executive
power (based on the aggregate effects of minor incursions on
presidential prerogatives). And in Northern Pipeline and Schor,
the Court worried about too great a dissipation of judicial power
(based on the aggregate effects of multiple encroachments on Article III judges’ prerogatives). This Essay, by contrast, focuses on
the converse concern: potentially too great a concentration of
federal executive power (based on the aggregate effects of multiple minor incursions on separated and divided power along three
constitutionally resonant dimensions).
That said, regardless whether sovereign power is excessively concentrated or problematically dispersed, the aggregateeffects analytical approach ought to apply with equal force. Indeed, this aggregate-effects approach seemingly paves the way
for future synthetic projects that first carefully study particular
institutional and policy domains and then assess how much consolidation is happening and whether the sum total of consolidating
forces along multiple axes in that one substantive domain represents an impermissible affront to constitutional governance.75
CONCLUSION
This Essay puts forward two challenges: one sounding in institutional design and the other in constitutional law. It is my
hope that future work in the areas of national security and separation of powers will remain sensitive to the multidimensional

74 See Wellness International Network, Ltd v Sharif, 135 S Ct 1932, 1944–49 (2015)
(applying a seemingly similar aggregate-effects analysis and determining that, as in
Schor, the sum total of alleged incursions on the Article III judiciary did not amount to a
constitutional violation).
75 Whether such challenges can be successfully litigated in the courts is, of course, a
separate question. It might be difficult for plaintiffs to show injury in national-security
cases, let alone injuries attributable to multidimensional consolidation per se. For this
reason, aggregate-effects claims might be better directed to officials in the executive and
legislative branches with the hope that the political branches take such harms seriously.
See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212, 1220 (1978) (recognizing that constitutional norms
should not necessarily be “coterminous with the scope of judicial enforcement” and that
other institutions besides courts can address “underenforced constitutional norms”).
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nature of institutional and organizational redesigns, both for
purposes of making smarter, more careful architectural design
choices and for purposes of safeguarding our constitutional system and its underlying structural commitments.

